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Smith: Evidence Admissible during the Punishment Stage of a Criminal Tri

EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE DURING THE PUNISHMENT
STAGE OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL
JOSEPH F. SMITH*
Most criminal proceedings in Texas are two-staged since the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1965.1 Under such a trial
system, there is first a trial on the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
and then if a conviction is returned, there is a separate hearing to assess punishment. Section 3(a) of the statute has two major impacts.
The first is that it has greatly expanded the type of evidence which
the state may introduce at the punishment stage, and the second is
that it allow defendants to take the stand at this second stage for the
purpose of mitigation of punishment without fear of self-incrimination. Section 3(a) provides that "evidence may be offered by the
State and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, and his character."2 The court of criminal
appeals held that the statute is not exclusive, and that evidence in mitigation of punishment or relevant to an application for probation is
admissible.3 The purpose of this article is to explain specifically what
evidence can be offered by both sides at the punishment stage of a
criminal trial.
Prior Criminal Record
Section 3(a) of article 37.074 defines the term, "prior criminal
record" as "a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or
*
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B.A., Bucknell University; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
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1. TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.07 (Supp. 1974).

Presently 1st Lt. U.S.

2. Id. art. 37.07(3)(a). The article is permissive in that neither the state nor the
defense is required to introduce any evidence at the punishment stage. Brumfield v.
State, 445 S.W.2d 732, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Morales v. State, 416 S.W.2d 436,
437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
3. Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
4. The original provision in the 1965 Code was article 37.07(2)(b), which pro-

vided in part, "[r]egardless of whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the
jury, evidence may be offered by the State and the defendant as to the prior criminal
record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character." Tex. Laws 1965, ch.
722, at 462. The 1967 amendment only renumbered the subsection and added a sentence defining the term "prior criminal record." Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 659, § 22, at 1740.
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suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged." 5 Any probated or suspended
sentence assessed prior to trial, whether completed or not, is admissible.' A conviction in a court of record which has not resulted in a
probated or suspended sentence is not "final" until the time for filing
an appeal has expired, or until the court of criminal appeals has affirmed on appeal.7 If a defendant wishes to contest a conviction as
not "final," he has the burden of proof.8
Since the article states that such a final conviction must come from
a "court of record," the general rule is that final convictions in a justice or corporation court are not admissible,9 as these are not courts
of record.' 0 The exception is that such a final conviction may be introduced if it is material to the offense charged."
Section 3(a) greatly expands the scope of prior final convictions
which can be introduced by the state. Prior to the enactment of this
article, the state was limited to prior final convictions used for enhancement of punishment under the habitual criminal statutes,' 2 or
for impeachment under Article 38.29 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.' 3
The defendant must take the stand before he can be impeached under article 38.29, but this is not necessary under section 3(a). Additionally, article 38.29 requires that prior final convictions used for impeachment must have been for a felony or a misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude,' 4 but section 3(a) is not so limited.' 5 In fact, section
5. This definition was held constitutional in Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 364
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
6. Glenn v. State, 442 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
7. Arbuckle v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 371, 372-73, 105 S.W.2d 219, 219-20 (1937).
8. See Gardner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
9. Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
10. Since court martial proceedings are courts of record within the statute, prior military convictions are admissible. Thompson v. Price, 258 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 922 (1958); Johnson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968).
11. Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); accord, Beard
v. State, 458 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
12. For misdemeanors see, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 61, repealed January 1,
1974, recodified in, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.43 (1974); for felonies see, TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. art. 61-64, repealed January 1, 1974, recodified in, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 12.42 (1974). These statutes require various minimum sentences far greater than
those normally prescribed for repeat offenders who fall within their coverage.
13. TEx. CODE CRiM. P. ANN. art. 38.29 (1966).

14. Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). The statutory
definition also includes a suspended sentence given and not set aside or a probated sentence with the period for probation unexpired.
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3(a) is not limited to prior final convictions which bear any relationship to the offense charged,1" nor is it limited by any rule of remoteness, as is article 38.29.17
Section 3(a) does not require that prior final convictions be alleged
in the indictment; the enhancement statutes require such allegation as
a prerequisite to admissibility.' Article 37.07 puts every accused on
notice that the state is entitled to show ,his prior criminal record: 9
probated sentences are inadmissible under the enhancement statute, 0
but they are expressly admissible under article 37.07.21 Additionally,
although a prior final conviction with a suspended sentence will be
admitted under section 3(a),2 2 it will not be admitted under the enhancement statutes. 28 The latter statutes require that each succeeding
conviction be subsequent to the previous conviction in point of time
both of the commission of the offense and of the conviction; section
3(a), however, has no such requirement. 24 Both the enhancement
statutes and section 3(a) provide that an appealed conviction is not
final until affirmed. 25 A prior final conviction under section 3(a)
need not bear any relationship to the present charge, 6 while under
articles 61 and 62 of the old penal code, it must have been for the
"same offense" in the case of misdemeanors, and the "same offense or
one of the same nature" in the case of felones. 27
Although the court of criminal appeals has stated that any prior
conviction relevant under article 37.07(3)(a) is admissible, there is
one limited type of "final conviction" in a court of record which is
not admissible by virtue of superior statutory mandate.2" Section
51.13 of the Family Code states that no adjudication of the status of
any child made in juvenile court shall be deemed a conviction. Such
15. Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
16. Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
17. Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
18. Martinez v. State, 469 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Hathorne v.
State, 459 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971);
Pendleton v. State, 434 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
19. Ellingsworth v. State, 487 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
20. Perry v. State, 464 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
21. Glenn v. State, 442 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
22. Macias v. State, 451 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
23. Ellis v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 346, 349, 115 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1938).
24. Burton v. State, 493 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
25. Arbuckle v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 371, 376, 105 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937).
26. Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
27. This last statutory requirement has been eliminated in the new Penal Code.
28. Slaton v. State, 418 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
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adjudications could be admitted, however, as part of the juvenile
record or in a pre-sentence report.
Article 37.07 does impose a major limitation on the state in that
while it may introduce the prior final convictions, it may not describe
the actual crimes." Even the use of a "summary" of the prior acts,"0
or stipulations to the prior convictions reciting the details of the offenses,"' is reversible error. It is, however, within the discretion of the
trial court to allow the defendant to testify to such circumstances. 2
In this connection the defense attorney meets -a special problem
when his defendant has committed a series of offenses in one criminal
transaction. An example of this is the robbery-rape-murder situation.
The state may choose to try the defendant separately for each crime.
At each trial the problem arises that under the criminal transaction
exception to the relevancy rules, the state will be able to prove all
three crimes at the guilt/innocence stage of each trial. The prejudice
is obvious: at the penalty stage of the robbery trial, the defendant is
almost certain to receive a much greater sentence than if evidence of
the rape-murder had not been admitted, especially if a jury assesses
punishment. The defense counsel's tactic to combat this prejudice is
to explain to the jury at the punishment stage that the defendant will
be or has been tried for the other crimes as well. But the court of
criminal appeals has refused ito allow this admission: "There is no
provision [in Article 37.07] for introduction into evidence . . . that
any other charge is pending . . . and has been disposed of in another
trial. ' 33 This is a totally unfair rule in light of the practical advantage
held by the state in such a situation. Clearly, the defense should be allowed to mitigate the prejudice, and thereby, the punishment.
Proving Prior Criminal Record From Final Convictions
Proving prior convictions is a two-stage process for the state.

4

29. "[T]he State, while authorized to prove an accused's 'prior criminal record' by
virtue of Article 37.07 . . .is not authorized to prove the details of every offense resulting in a conviction which forms part of the 'prior criminal record.'" Cain v. State, 468
S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
30. Lege v. State, 501 S.W.2d 880, 881-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Mullins v. State,
492 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
31. Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
32. Bircher v. State, 491 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
33. Nash v. State, 467 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
34. All of these rules apply whether the prior final conviction is from Texas or
another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)
where federal convictions were used.
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First, the state must prove the existence of a prior final conviction; it
then must prove that the defendant in the present trial was that person previously convicted. Although these present jury questions, 5 the
sufficiency of this evidence is a question of law.3 6
To prove the existence of prior convictions, the state may introduce
certified copies of the prior judgments,3 7 sentences,3 8 probation orders, and even pictures of the person convicted or documents containing his fingerprints, any of which may bear the defendant's signature.
These copies will come from and be certified by the district clerk or
by the custodian of records of the Texas Department of Corrections.
According to statutory provisions"' such copies will be accepted into
evidence on an equal footing with the originals. Article 38.02 adopts
for criminal trials all civil evidence rules which do not conflict with
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code.
The Official Records Act 40 states that certified copies from the custodian of records shall be accepted as originals. 41 The best evidence and
hearsay objections, as well as the need for an in-court authentication
are therefore eliminated.4 2 Article 37.07 puts a defendant on notice
that the state may show prior final convictions; it does not, however,
apprise him of the method to be used. If article 3731a is to be used,
its provisions must be followed. Section 3 states that copies of the certified record must be delivered to opposing counsel at a "reasonable
time before trial, unless in the opinion of the trial court the adverse
party has not been unfairly surprised by the failure to deliver such
' 43
copy.
35. See Andrews v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 392, 393-94, 228 S.W.2d 173, 174 (1950).
36. See Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
37. It is not error to admit an unsigned judgment if certified. Robinson v. State,
449 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
38. Use of judgments and sentences will of necessity cause the defendant's prior sentence to be before the jury, as well as the fact of the prior conviction. This is permissible; in fact, the state may bring this out in testimony, and it is not error. Gilmore
v. State, 493 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
39. TEx. CODE ClM. P. ANN. art. 38.02 (1966); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
3731a (1961).
40. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3731(a) (1961).
41. Johnson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
42. Jones v. State, 470 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Denham v. State,
428 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Graham v. State, 422 S.W.2d 922,
926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
43. Sierra v. State, 476 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). Failure to notarize and certify these copies as required by the statute renders them inadmissible. Vessels v. State, 432 S.W.2d 108, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). These certified records need
not be introduced into evidence. Simmons v. State, 457 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970); Vessels v. State, 432 S.W.2d 108, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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43

The second step in proving prior convictions is to prove that the
present defendant is the person who was previously convicted. Failure
to do so is reversible error." The court of criminal appeals has approved several methods of proving this allegation, including the testi-

mony of a witness who identifies the accused as the person previously

convicted,4 5 introduction of certified copies of prison records or trial
pleadings containing handwriting or fingerprints of the convicted defendant,46 supported by expert testimony identifying them as those of
the accused,4 7 stipulation, 4 and admission under direct examination
on the stand by the accused."

In the context of providing independent testimony, the extent of
the state's right to call the defendant over his objection to testify that

he was the one previously convicted has been questioned. The rule is
that when the defendant voluntarily takes the stand, he does so for all
purposes, including proof of prior final convictions. When, however,

the defendant voluntarily testifies at the guilt/innocence stage, but objects to being called at the punishment stage, the status of the law is
unclear. There are three leading cases in the area.
44. Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) held that "it is incumbent on the state to go further [than the mere introduction of prior convictions] and
show by independent testimony that the [defendant] was the identical person so previously convicted ....
[F]ailure to comply with this requirement is reversible error." Id.
at 858; accord, Smith v. State, 489 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Vessels v.
State, 432 S.W.2d 108, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). Examples of failure to provide
"independent testimony" and the resulting reversal are found in Elizalde v. State, 507
S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (failure to connect fingerprints); Baker v.
State, 505 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (stating name insufficient); Chaney
v. State, 494 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (district attorney repeating vague
prior statements made by defendant in another trial admitting conviction of an offense
similar to that introduced by State is insufficient); Smith v. State, 489 S.W.2d 920, 921
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (defense counsel's unsworn statement referring to "these two
convictions" is not connecting evidence).
45. Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
46. Id. at 859. The prints used for comparison to the certified copies will usually
be taken just before or during the trial. This does not violate fifth amendment rights,
Burton v. State, 471 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Villareal v. State, 468
S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); and they need not be taken in the presence
of counsel. Burton v. State, 471 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Rinehart
v. State, 463 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
47. Expert testimony is required. Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971).
48. Id. at 859. But defense counsel's unsworn jury argument that refers to "these
two convictions" is not a stipulation, and is not connecting evidence. See Smith v. State,
489 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
49. Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Beard v. State,
458 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
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In Stratman v. State,50 a bench trial, the defendant voluntarily
testified at the guilt/innocence stage about previous final felony convictions alleged in the indictment for enhancement purposes. If the convictions had been used for impeachment, they would have been admissible. Defendant was recalled, over his objection, at the punishment
hearing and forced to identify himself as the person previously convicted. The court of criminal appeals affirmed finding no reversible
error because "had all of appellant's testimony . . . been elicited on

cross-examination for impeachment purposes, there would have been
no reversible error.""1
The subsequent case of Brumfield v. State52 presented the situation in
which the defendant voluntarily took the stand at the guilt/innocence
stage. There were no final prior convictions alleged in the indictment,
none available for impeachment, and it was a jury trial. The defendant was recalled, over objection, at the punishment stage and forced
to connect himself to certain prior final convictions. The court held
this to be reversible error. 8 It distinguished Stratman on the basis
that Brumfield was a jury trial, and that in Stratman the prior final
convictions there were available for impeachment and used for en54
hancement.
Three judges in Brumfield were of the opinion that since
article
27.07 provides for two separate proceedings, a defendant's waiver of
his right against self-incrimination by taking the stand-at the guilt/innocence stage is limited to that particular stage and does not carry
over to the punishment stage. 55
The question arose again in Ballard v. State,56 where the defendant
was asked at the punishment stage to connect himself with prior final
convictions. There was no majority opinion on the propriety of such
act: the court held that any error had been waived by a failure to object to the testimony at trial.5 7 It is apparent, then, that until the
court's position is clarified the cautious defendant should object to the
introduction of such evidence at either stage to preserve the point on
appeal.
50. 436 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
51. Id. at 146.
52. 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
53. Id. at 733-34; accord, Ballard v. State, 450 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
54. Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
55. Id. at 741. The concurring judges stated that the rule in Stratman was applicable. Id. at 742.
56. 450 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
57. Id. at 85.
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Problems of Joint Trial
The problems of admissibility of previous convictions increase in a
joint trial. While prior final convictions of co-defendants may not be
admitted at the guilt stage, they will be admitted at the penalty stage.
Every attorney knows that instructing the jury not to consider the
prior convictions of co-defendants in determining punishment is no
more effective to erase the prejudice of "punishment by association"
at this stage of trial than it would be to erase "guilt by association"
prejudice at the guilt/innocence stage. The defense attorney's only alternative to protect his client from the prejudice of a co-defendant's
prior convictions is to move for a severance under Article 36.09 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which provides,
in cases in which, upon timely motion to sever, and evidence
introduced thereon, it is made known to the court that there
is a previous admissible conviction against one defendant or that
a joint trial would be prejudicial to any defendant, the court shall
order a severance as to the defendant whose
joint trial would pre58
judice the other defendant or defendants.
The court of criminal appeals has given this statute a relatively restricted reading. Severance is mandatory only if at either stage of the
bifurcated trial, one defendant has had admissible prior final convictions and a co-defendant has not. 59 In a case where all defendants
have had admissible prior final convictions, the movant must show
that a "joint trial would be prejudicial" because, for example, of the
nature of the co-defendants' crime or the large number of his admissible convictions as compared with the movant's. 60 This ground for
severance is within the sound discretion of the court.
The purpose of this statute is to provide judicial economy through
the use of joint trials.61 This purpose, coupled with the reluctance of
the court of criminal appeals to find abuse of discretion in any criminal case, indicates that failure to grant a severance results in reversal
only if severance was mandatory. The problem that remains is that
everyone-judge, prosecutor, defendant, and defense attorney-knows
that the jury never follows the instructions not to consider the prior final
convictions of co-defendants in assessing punishment any more than
they would do so in determining guilt at the guilt/innocence stage of
58.

TEx. CoDE CRIM.

59.

Robinson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 239, 240-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).

P. ANN. art. 36.09 (Supp. 1974).

60. Id. at 241.
61. Before this article was passed, severance was a matter of right.
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the trial. But the court of criminal appeals has apparently decided
that such judicial fictions are worth the increased judicial efficiency.
PriorVoid Criminal Convictions
The holding of the United States Supreme Court in Loper v.
Beto, 2 that an invalid conviction cannot be used to prove guilt, enhance punishment, or impeach,6 3 applies to section 3(a). 64 The effect
of this ruling on section 3(a) is demonstrated by a defendant's claim
that he was denied his right to counsel at a prior trial, and that, therefore, the prior final conviction is inadmissible. Characteristically, the
court of criminal appeals has placed the burden on, the defendant
claiming that a prior criminal conviction was void to prove that he
was indigent at the time of that trial, that he was not apprised of his
right to counsel, and that he did not waive his right to counsel. The
absence of a recitation on the face of the judgment or sentence is not
determinative, 65 and such a recitation is binding in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 66 Even when there is such a showing, however,
67
the court may find such error harmless.
General Reputation and Character
The general reputation contemplated by the statute is that maintained prior to trial, and it is not error to exclude evidence of the defendant's general reputation prior to the time of his arrest. 68 In James
v. State 9 the court of criminal appeals held that the only proper way
to show reputation and character is through testimony regarding the
defendant's reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen. Questioning pursuant to this section of the statute, therefore, should follow
70
this particular form:
62. 405 U.S. 473 (1973).

63. Id. at 482-84.
64. Cherry v. State, 488 S.W.2d 744, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 909 (1973).
65. Ex parte Scott, 485 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
66. Gutierrez v. State, 456 S.W.2d 84, 85-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
67. As it did in Marks v. State, 454 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
68. Simmons v. State, 504 S.W.2d 465, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
69. 479 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), noted in 51 TEXAS L. REv. 148
(1972).
70. Form sustained in Lovett v. State, 479 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972); Witt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Pogue v. State, 474
S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Smith v. State, 414 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967).
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Q

Are you familiar with the reputation of the defendant as a
peaceable and law-abiding citizen in the community in which
he resides?
A Yes, sir.
or
Q Are you familiar with the reputation of the defendant as a
peaceable and law-abiding citizen in the community in which
he resides and among those with whom he associates?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, what is that reputation?
A It is bad (or good)."
When the testimony is given by a defense witness, it is usually by a
teacher, co-worker, or neighbor. When given by a state's witness, the
testimony generally comes from the arresting or investigating officers,72 but it can come from anyone, even the prosecuting attorney.7"
Such reputation testimony, is of course, an exception to the hearsay
rule. 74 Notwithstanding the fact that the witness states he has never
heard the accused's reputation discussed in the community, the witness is permitted to testify that he knows the general reputation of the
accused as peaceable and law-abiding, and that his reputation is
good. If, however, the witness testifies that accused's reputation is
bad, he must have actually heard someone say so, or he may not testify.75
The state may not introduce testimony of bad reputation which is
based solely on the arrest for the present charges. 76 But the reputation
71. In Reeves v. State, 491 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex. Grim. App. 1973), the witness
had no opinion. There the state called a character witness who was asked if he knew
the defendant and had an opinion as to his reputation as a peaceable and law abiding
citizen. When he stated that he had no opinion, the state passed the witness. Since
no objection was made, the court held no error to be presented.
72. Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Frison v. State,
473 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Walker v. State, 454 S.W.2d 415, 420
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (juvenile parole officer); Sprinkle v. State, 452 S.W.2d 456,
457 (Tex. Grim. App. 1970) (adult probation officer).
73. Gonzales v. State, 466 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). Allowing
proof of reputation and character does not deprive the accused of a fair and impartial
trial. Davis v. State, 429 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Grim. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1096 (1969).
74. Maldonado v. State, 467 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Grim. App. 1971).
75. Weatherall v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 415, 417, 264 S.W.2d 429, 430 (1954); Gilson v. State, 140 Tex. Grim. 345, 346, 145 S.W.2d 182. 183 (1940); Ewing v. State,
120 Tex. Crim. 137, 141, 49 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1931).
It does not matter to whom the state's witness has spoken, and if it was a confidential
informant, the prosecution may not be forced to divulge that person's identity. Durham
v. State, 466 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
76. Frison v. State, 473 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Tex. Grim. App. 1971).
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witness may testify even if he does not know the defendant, 7 or has
known him only since the date of his arrest,78 and the reputation
need not have been discussed prior to the arrest79 or offense. 80 As a
practical matter, then, if such reputation is based solely on the arrest,
it will be almost impossible to prove.
Although Section 51.13 of the Family Code" makes certain portions of the record of prior juvenile proceedings inadmissible, it does
not prevent a witness from testifying to the general reputation of a defendant when such reputation has been gained as a result of such proceedings. The article "concerns only testimony regarding the disposi,tion of matters having been adjudicated in juvenile court and in no
way affects the qualification of one having personal knowledge of appellant's general reputation in the community. '8 2 The admissibility of
such testimony is not affected because the defendant was a juvenile at
83
the time his reputation was acquired.
Truth and Veracity

In Logan v. State84 the defense attempted to elicit testimony from
the defendant's homeroom teacher that, "[A]s I knew Mr. Logan in
the classroom, his reputation for truth and veracity was good." 85 The
defense argued that such testimony should be admissible to show
character as distinguished from reputation. The court of criminal appeals disagreed, stating that the rule was well established that if the
state had attacked his general reputation for truth and veracity
through any witness, or had attempted to impeach the defendant
through Article 38.29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then he
would have been permitted to have introduced such proof; but until
such contingency arose, the fact that he gave testimony disputing that
offered by the state would not make his testimony admissible. 86
77. Id. at 485.
78. Lovett v. State, 479 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Witt v. State,
475 S.W.2d 259, 261-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
79. Frison v. State, 473 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
80. Glenn v. State, 442 S.W.2d 360, 362-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
81. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 51.13(b) (1975).
82. Fortson v. State, 474 S.W.2d 234, 235-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Walker v.
State, 454 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
83. Garcia v. State, 502 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
84. 455 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
85. Id. at 269.
86. Id. at 269; accord, Wallace v, State, 501 SW.24 883, 886 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973),
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Evidence Relevant to an Application for Probation or to Mitigate
Punishment

This is the judicially created catch-all category under which the
court of criminal appeals allows evidence to come before the court or
jury which does not fall into the statutory classifications of "prior
criminal record" or "reputation and character." This includes evidence of the defendant's juvenile record, pre-sentence reports, proof
of facts of the offense charged, probation-related testimony, specific
acts of misconduct, and various other matters. Since the test is "relevancy," hard and fast rules in this area are difficult to establish from
the decisions. The factor of whether the jury or the court will sentence seems to be a dominant consideration in determining admissibility.
Juvenile Record

Walker v. State87 involved a question which "appear[ed] to be one
of first impression; that is, whether, in a punishment hearing before
the court, testimony may be elicited from the accused concerning his
juvenile record."8 8 The court held that under the circumstances such
an inquiry "makes a great deal of sense." It was carefully noted, however, that the hearing was before the court and that the same information could have been contained in a pre-sentencing report.89 A different result would possibly be reached if a jury were to assess
punishment, but the court of criminal appeals has not yet had an opportunity to decide the issue.
The court in Walker did not consider the application of article
2338-1(13)(d), which stated that "the disposition of a child or any
evidence given in the court shall not be admissible into evidence
against the child in any case or proceeding in any court other than
the juvenile court .

... ,0o Presumably, since this information, along

with the rest of the defendant's juvenile record, is often contained in a
pre-sentence report, it would probably be admissible before the court,
but not before a jury.
87. 493 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
88. Id.at 240.
89. TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. arts. 42.12(4), 42.13(4) (1966).
90. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1(13)(d), recodified in, TEx. FAMILY
CODE ANN. § 51.13(a) (1975).
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Pre-Sentence Report
The trial judge may order a probation officer to report to the court
"the circumstances of the offense, criminal record, social history and
present condition of the defendant." 9 1 The judicially stated purpose of
this procedure is "to provide the trial court with succinct and precise
information upon which to base a rational decision on the motion for
probation." 92
Although a pre-sentence report containing the defendant's "social
history" helps a trial judge reach "rational" decisions regarding probation, the same is not true for juries. In Tezeno v. State9 3 the defendant asserted that the trial court committed error "in not allowing
him to offer evidence concerning the sociological, economic, political,
and overall conditions of his neighborhood at the punishment phase
of the trial." 4 Certainly these criteria constitute social history. "We
fail to perceive," the court of criminal appeals responded, "how the
evidence which the defendant sought to offer would be relevant."9 5
The court of criminal appeals has held that while it is "desirable"
that the trial court turn a copy of the report over to the defense, it is
not required to do so. 9 This decision is deemed to rest within the
sound discretion of the court.9 7 Although the report may contain
hearsay statements, the court is not bound, as a jury would be, to disregard them.""
Proof of Facts of Offense After Guilty Plea or Verdict
After the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1965, defense attorneys tried to preclude the introduction of evidence concerning the offense charged in the indictment by entering a plea of guilty
and arguing that on such a plea, this evidence was irrelevant. The
court of criminal appeals rejected this argument in Darden v. State,9 9
where it stated,
CODE CIM. P. ANN. art. 42.12(4) (1966).
92. Rodriguez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
93. 484 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

91. Tax.

94. Id. at 379.
95. Id. at 380.
96. Rodriguez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

97. Id. at 14-15.
98. Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

See also Brown

v. State, 478 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
99. 430 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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It is well established that a plea of guilty to a felony charge before
a jury admits the existence of all facts necessary to establish guilt
and, in such cases, the introduction of testimony by the State is
to enable the jury to intelligently exercise the discretion which the
law vests in them touching the penalty to be assessed. 100
In Brazile v. State,10 1 a murder conviction, the court of criminal appeals took the first step in granting the same right to a defendant.
There, the defendant called no witnesses at the guilt/innocence stage
of the trial. At the punishment stage he attempted to testify to his version of the facts and circumstances surrounding the homicide. The
court pointed out that in Foster v. State10 2 it had held that the presence or absence of malice in murder cases relates only to punishment,
since there are no degrees of murder in Texas. It would thus appear
proper to submit the issue of malice only during the punishment
stage.'1 3 The court then concluded that since defendant's testimony
would not have raised any affirmative defense, but would have related
only to mitigation of punishment, it should have been allowed. 104
Four months later, in Marrero v. State, 0 5 the court held that the
presence or absence of malice is determinative of punishment in cases
of assault with intent to murder. The defendant, who had offered no
witnesses at the guilt/innocence stage, should have been allowed to
testify about the circumstances surrounding the assault, and the case
was reversed for a new punishment hearing.
In Kelly v. State' the court held that although the voluntary use
of narcotics or drugs will not justify or excuse one from being held
accountable for any criminal offense, it may be considered for the
purpose of mitigation of punishment.'0 7
The developing rule seems to permit the defendant to remain silent
until the punishment stage of the trial, and at that time to testify to
100. Id. at 495.
101. 497 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). See Crampton, Changes in the Punishment Hearing at the Bifurcated Criminal Trial, 37 TEx. B.J. 153 (1974), cited in several opinions by the court of criminal appeals, which considers the effect of this case.
102. 493 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
103. Brazile v. State, 497 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
104. In Brazile, the court discussed White v. State, 444 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969), a statutory rape case, and said that testimony regarding the defendant's relationship with the prosecutrix on and before the night of the alleged rape, since not in the
nature of an affirmative defense, should have been admitted in mitigation of punishment.
Brazile v. State, 497 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
105. 500 S.W.2d 818, 819-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
106. 442 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
107. Id. at 727-28.
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any facts surrounding the offense that may apply to mitigation of
punishment. The defendant will not, however, be allowed to testify to

facts which will tend to exonerate him or to raise affirmative defenses.' 0
Testimony Specifically Regarding Application for Probation
In Allaben v. State, 0 9 a sodomy prosecution, the defendant was not

permitted to show the jury that since the offense he had been seeing a
psychiatrist twice a week in connection with his problem, and that he
hoped to continue treatment if granted probation. On appeal this was

held error, but not reversible error. The later case of Schulz v.
State" held it was not error to admit psychiatric testimony that it
would be better for the defendant to be placed on probation rather
than sentenced to the Department of Corrections. A subsequent case,
Logan v. State,"' held that the defendant had no right to have a pro-

bation officer testify to the purposes of probation or the requirements
necessary for probation. 11 2 This holding reaffirmed the earlier Alla-

ben case, in which the jury, after retiring to determine punishment,
,requested from the judge information on the statutory requirements

not contained in the charge. The trial court refused, and this was upheld on appeal."1
Other Admissible Testimony
With regard to miscellaneous matters, a defendant may testify to
his remorse for having participated in the offense,"14 his prior good
conduct,"'5 and that he has never been arrested" 6 or convicted of a
108. Dixon v. State, 506 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The state apparently may allow the victim to exhibit his scars resulting from the attack to the jury
during the punishment stage. The defendant has the burden of showing prejudice.
Jones v. State, 481 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
109. 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
110. 446 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
111. 455 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
112. Id. at 270.
113. Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); accord, Logan
v. State, 455 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
In the recent case of Wallace v. State, 501 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), the
prosecutor asked the defendant, "Would you tell the Jury whether [defense counsel] told
you that there were in excess of five hundred probationers here in Smith County, and
there are only two probation supervision officers to look after them?" Id. at 886. The
question was held irrelevant and its asking error, but not such error as to require reversal
of the conviction.
114. Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
115. Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
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felony'1 7 or any criminal offense." 8 He may tell the jury of his past
and present employment, 119 his grades in high school or college, 20
degrees earned, 2 ' or the fact that he holds an honorable discharge.' 22
The defendant may promise to abide by the terms of probation,' 2 3
and promise that he will live at home with his parents, 24 and he may
ask for mercy.' 2 5 He may also explain his motives for the crime. 26
Parents and siblings may testify that the defendant can be rehabilitat1 27
ed, although the state may refute such testimony through an expert.
Defendant may show a history of alcoholism and hospitalization thereThe state may read article 37.07(3)(a) to the jury. 29 All
for.'12
these matters have been held relevant to mitigation of punishment or
to an application for probation.
Specific Acts of Misconduct
The general rule is that the state may not prove prior acts of misconduct which have not resulted in final convictions. Hence, in Jones
v. State 80 the court held it to be reversible error to bolster a state witness for defendant's bad reputation by the introduction of photographs of the defendant, in the nude, leading a parade through downtown Dallas. The court rejected the argument that the photos were
evidence of bad character, and held instead that reputation testimony
was the proper method to show bad character.
There is, however, another rule which may admit
into evidence
specific actions which have not resulted in final convictions. Such
proof may be adduced when it "is relevant to a fair determination of
116. Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Allaben v. State,
418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).

117. Id. at 519; Smith v.State, 414 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
118. McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
119. Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Allaben v. State,

418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
120. Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
121. ld. at 519.
122. Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
123. McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

124. id. at 823; Childs v. State, 491 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
125. Richardson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).

126. Nichols v. State, 500 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

127. Armstrong v. State, 502 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
128. Hendrix v. State, 459 S.W.2d 634, 635-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Ingram v.

State, 426 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).

129. Harden v. State, 417 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
130. 479 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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an accused's application for probation,"'' 1 just as is evidence of specific prior good acts.'8 2 Thus, the court has allowed inquiry into
whether the defendant is addicted to any drug 88 or has ever been
hospitalized for addiction,13 has ever shot "speed" and how often,'
and if he uses or purchases marijuana.186 Although proof of prior acts
of misconduct which have not resulted in prior convictions may follow a good reputation witness through a state rebuttal witness, 87 or
even be elicited from the defendant himself 18 or one of his reputation
but
witnesses, the purpose for their introduction is not impeachment
89
probation.
for
application
an
rather their relevancy toward
"Opening the Door" to Otherwise Inadmissible Testimony

While the provisions of article 37.07 are very broad, there is still a
limit to what the state may offer. For example, evidence of pending
trials, prior indictments that resulted in acquittals, arrests, and the
facts of a particular conviction are all inadmissible. 4 Any of these
may, however, be admitted under the auspices of impeachment under
Article 38.29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the provi-

sions of that article the fact that a witness has been charged with an
offense is inadmissible for the purpose of impeachment, unless the
proffered charge has resulted in a final conviction of a felony or
crime involving moral turpitude and is not too remote. But if the defendant "opens the door" and makes blanket statements concerning
his exemplary conduct, the state may refute such testimony despite
the nature of the conviction or its remoteness.' 4 '
131. Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McCrea v. State,
494 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis v. State, 478 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
132. The rule in Jones v. State, 418 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), coupled
with the "relevancy toward an application for probation rule," presents an interesting
problem. What can the state do to get specific acts of misconduct before the jury if
no application for probation is filed? There was none in Jones, the prosecution was
forced to use the character theory, and it was refused. This writer has not seen an answer in the cases.
133. McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
134. Holmes v. State, 502 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
135. McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 823-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
136. Id. at 824.
137. Davis v. State, 478 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
138. McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Santiago v.
State, 444 S.W.2d 758, 759, (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
139. Holmes v. State, 502 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McCrea v.
State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
140. Bermudez v. State, 504 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
141. Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). On the other
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Therefore, if the defendant says in response to questioning either
by his lawyer' 42 or by the prosecutor. 4 that he has never been in
trouble before, he has thrown the door wide open to impeaching evidence. The state may then introduce arrests,'
criminal indict1 45
ments,
outstanding or unexecuted arrest warrants, 4 6: prior inconsistent statements, 47 and prior final convictions from courts not of
record, even if not material to the offense charged. 148 A motion in
limine against the introduction of these matters cannot prevent such
1 49
impeachment.
Good reputation testimony also "opens the door" to the extent of
proper cross-examination of the witness. The general rule is that the
state is allowed to ask such witnesses if they have heard of specific
acts of misconduct of the defendant. It may not, however, ask whether the witness had personal knowledge of the act, nor may the questions be framed so as to imply that the act was actually committed.
As a prerequisite to such cross-examination, the state must have a
good faith belief that the act actually occurred. Any act of misconduct
may be discussed, so long as it is not inconsistent with the character
trait about which the witness testifies.
The rationale behind the rule is that reputation is an opinion based
on hearsay: the witness is testifying to his opinion of the defendant's
reputation, based on what he has heard others say. In order to test the
witness' opinion, the state is permitted to ask whether the witness has
heard-not whether he knows-of facts or reports inconsistent with a
good reputation. The theory is that if the witness is truly familiar with
the defendant's reputation, he will also have heard of adverse reports
which are circulating in the community, the inquiry being not what
the defendant is, but rather what he is thought to be.
Hence, the question "have you heard" of a specific act of misconduct tests the grounds upon which the witness bases his opinion, and
hand, the general statement by the defendant that he has lived a clean life for 22 years
does not open the door to evidence of specific arrests and bad acts.

S.W.2d
142.
143.
144.

Smith v. State, 506

602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881, 883-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110, 118-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Barnett v.

State, 445 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).

145. Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
146. Id. at 885.
147. Sierra v. State, 476 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).

148. Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110, 118-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
149. Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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goes to the weight of the testimony. The inquiry is not to test the
truth and veracity of the witness (as it is in the case of impeachment
under article 38.29), but rather whether what he says is supported by
150
fact.
CONCLUSION

As the rules have developed, the test of "evidence in mitigation of
punishment or relevant to an application for probation" has been the
most important. Its liberal application by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has the salutory effect of "taking the blinders off of the
jury." In this respect, I suggest the following changes in the law,
which run counter to the philosophy and intent of article 37.07, the
"mitigation" and the "relevancy" tests.
First, in any situation where a defendant is tried for one criminal
offense which is part of a criminal transaction consisting of other different criminal offenses, for which he has been charged and is to be
or has been tried, and which are admissible for any purpose at the
present trial, the defendant should be allowed to show that charges
for the other criminal acts are pending or have been tried. This would
minimize the inclination of jurors to assess punishment for all criminal acts in the belief that if they do not, the defendant will escape
punishment for the other acts. Nash v. State' should be overruled.
Second, to the extent that Tezeno v. State'12 holds that evidence
of sociological, economic, political, and other similar conditions are
not "social history" of the defendant, it should be overruled. It should
also be overruled to the extent that it requires that "social history" is
admissible in a pre-sentence report to the court but not to a jury. Juries, too, wish to make "rational" sentencing decisions based on all
relevant evidence.
Third, there is no good reason that the emerging rule allowing the
defendant to remain silent at the guilt/innocence stage and then permits him to testify at the punishment stage about facts surrounding
the offense should be limited so as to prohibit him from alleging facts
which might constitute affirmative or avoidance defenses. After all,
the conviction cannot be rescinded, and such evidence should probably be allowed for whatever worth.
150. Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617, 619-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
151. 467 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
152. 484 S.W.Zd 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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57

Last, a rule which permits a defense witness to give favorable reputation testimony, even with no knowledge of that reputation, should
not be allowed to stand. Although the court has allowed it "for whatever it is worth," it is worth nothing and such a rationale borders on
suborning perjury. Logically, a witness should have heard a reputation before he is permitted to express an opinion about it. Weatherall
v. State1 5 and the cases it rests on should, therefore, also be overruled.
153.

159 Tex. Crim. 415, 264 S.W.2d 429 (1954).
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